Friday, February 4, 2011

FEb 2 Eight Tips for Better Brainstorming,

A recent Wall Street Journal story took on the hot topic of brainstorming. Titled "Brainstorming Works Best if People Scramble For Ideas on Their Own," the piece quoted research showing that people are "more creative" when they "brainstorm" alone rather than in meetings and offered supporting testimonials from managers.


This is a subject I am quite familiar with. Along with Andy Hargadon, I completed an 18-month ethnography in the 1990s on how the innovation consultants at IDEO do creative work, and we've both spent much of the past decade studying other innovative organizations. At the time, Andy was my PhD student, and now he is an associate professor at the University of California at Davis.

We agree that badly managed face-to-face brainstorms do stifle creativity and we agree that, even when brainstorming is done right, people probably can still generate ideas faster when they work alone. But it is total nonsense to conclude that if you want creativity, you ought to keep your people in solitary confinement where they can't "waste time" listening to and building on the ideas of others.

Here's the problem: Most studies of brainstorming are rigorous but irrelevant to the challenge of managing creative work. For starters, comparing whether creativity happens best in groups or alone is pretty silly when you look at how creative work is actually done. At creative companies, people switch between both modes so seamlessly that it is hard to notice where individual work ends and group work starts.

THEORY VS. PRACTICE.  At group brainstorms, individuals often "tune out" for 5 or 10 minutes to sketch a product or organizational structure inspired by the conversation, and then jump back into the conversation to show the others their idea. In another typical scenario, I recall an IDEO brainstorm about a cool haircutting device, after which one participant, engineer Roby Stancel, ran off to build it. Drawing a hard line between "individual" and "group" creativity in these and dozens of other examples is pointless. What really matters is that the two modes mingle as the creative process unfolds.

This artificial group vs. individual structure isn't the only problem with brainstorming experiments. These experiments are fake in that nearly all involve people who have no prior experience or training in group brainstorming. These brainstorming virgins (usually undergraduates in psychology classes) are briefly presented a list of rules and are then instructed to spend 10 or 15 minutes generating novel ideas about topics that they know and most likely care nothing about.

A common topic in these experiments is "What would happen if everyone had an extra thumb?" That might be fun to think about, but it isn't a problem they will ever actually face.

In contrast, consider real brainstorms led by SAP's Design Services Team in which participants care very much about, say, user-friendly software and will use any good ideas generated on the subject. These brainstorms have already led SAP to develop many clever prototypes and are starting to change the software that the company ships.

INNOVATION ENGINE.  These experimental studies also fail to mirror authentic brainstorms because the standard and essential rule "Build on and extend others' ideas" isn't applied. To allow cleaner comparisons between group and individual brainstorming "performance," individuals aren't asked to consider the ideas of others. In any event, it is impossible to build on the thinking of fellow brainstormers when you work alone.

The main finding from these studies is that people "brainstorming" alone speak more ideas (per person) into a microphone during the 10- or 15-minute period than those in a group brainstorm. Researchers conclude that the "productivity loss" of group brainstorming happens mainly because people take turns talking and therefore can't spew out ideas as fast. It's also worth noting that these studies don't count listening to other people's ideas as a productive behavior.

I am not joking; most of this research is that trivial.

Group brainstorming isn't a panacea even when it is done right, and is a waste of time—or worse—when done wrong. But a broad body of peer-reviewed research on teams and organizations, as well as my own observations, suggests that, when brainstorming sessions are managed right and skillfully linked to other work practices, such gatherings can promote innovation. Eight guidelines are especially important for running effective face-to-face brainstorms:

1. Use brainstorming to combine and extend ideas, not just to harvest ideas.
Andrew Hargadon's How Breakthroughs Happen shows that creativity occurs when people find ways to build on existing ideas. The power of group brainstorming comes from creating a safe place where people with different ideas can share, blend, and extend their diverse knowledge. If your goal is to just "collect the creative ideas that are out there," group brainstorms are a waste of time. A Web-based system for collecting ideas or an old-fashioned employee suggestion box is good enough.

2. Don't bother if people live in fear.
As Sigmund Freud observed, groups bring out the best and the worst in people. If people believe they will be teased, paid less, demoted, fired, or otherwise humiliated, group brainstorming is a bad idea. If your company fires 10% of its employees every year, for instance, people might be too afraid of saying something "dumb" to brainstorm effectively. It is better to have them just work alone.

3. Do individual brainstorming before and after group sessions.
Alex Osborn's 1950s classic Applied Imagination, which popularized brainstorming, gave advice that is still sound: Creativity comes from a blend of individual and collective "ideation." Skilled organizers tell participants what the topic will be before a brainstorm. I once went to a session on how to give an "itch-less haircut," and, at the suggestion of the organizer, took a preliminary trip to a salon where I asked the stylist for a cut as "itch-free as possible" to jumpstart my thinking. At the brainstorm, I reported how tightly the stylist wrapped the cape around my neck and how she put talcum powder all over me—effective, if uncomfortable and messy measures.

4. Brainstorming sessions are worthless unless they are woven with other work practices.
Brainstorming is just one of many practices that make a company creative, and it is of little value if it's not combined with other practices—such as observing users, talking to experts, or building prototype products or experiences—that provide an outlet for the ideas generated. Some of the worst "creative" companies that I've worked with are great at coming up with new ideas, but never actually get around to implementing them. A student and I once studied a team that spent a year brainstorming and arguing about a simple product without producing even a single prototype, even though a good engineer could have built one in an hour or two. The project was finally killed when a competitor came out with the product.

5. Brainstorming requires skill and experience both to do and, especially, to facilitate.
In all of the places that I've seen brainstorming used effectively—Hewlett-Packard, SAP's Design Services Team, the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford (or "The d.school"), the Institute for the Future, Frog Design, and IDEO—brainstorming is treated as a skill that takes months or years to master. Facilitating a session is a skill that takes even longer to develop. If you hold brainstorms every now and then, and they are led by people without skill and experience, don't be surprised if participants "sit there looking embarrassed, like we're all new to a nudist colony," as one manager toldThe Wall Street Journal. That is how humans act when they do something new and have poor teachers.

6. A good brainstorming session is competitive—in the right way.
In the best brainstorms, people feel pressure to show off what they know and how skilled they are at building on others' ideas. But people are also competitive in a paradoxical way. They "compete" to get everyone else to contribute, to make everyone feel like part of the group, and to treat everyone as collaborators toward a common goal. The worst thing a manager can do is set up the session as an "I win, you lose" game, in which ideas are explicitly rated, ranked, and rewarded.

A Stanford graduate student once told me about a team leader at his former company who started giving bonuses to people who generated "the best" ideas in brainstorms. The resulting fear and dysfunctional competition drastically reduced the number of ideas generated by what had been a creative and cooperative group just weeks earlier.

7. Use brainstorming sessions for more than just generating good ideas.
Brainstorms aren't just a place to generate good ideas. At IDEO, these gatherings support the company's culture and work practices in a host of other ways. Project teams use brainstorms to get inputs from people with diverse skills throughout the company. In the process, a lot of other good things happen. Knowledge is spread about new industries and technologies, newcomers and veterans learn—or are reminded—about who knows what, and jumping into a brainstorm for an hour or so to think about someone else's problem provides a welcome respite from each designer's own projects. The explicit goal of a group brainstorm is to generate ideas. But the other benefits of routinely gathering rotating groups of people from around a company to talk about new and old ideas might ultimately be more important for supporting creative work.

8. Follow the rules, or don't call it a brainstorm.
This is true even if you only hold occasional brainstorms and even if your work doesn't require constant creativity. The worst ""brainstorms"" happen when the term is used loosely, and the rules aren't followed—or known—at all. Perhaps the biggest mistake that leaders make is failing to keep their mouths shut. I once went to a meeting that started with the boss saying, "Let's brainstorm." He followed this pronouncement with 30 minutes of his own rambling thoughts, without a single idea coming from the others in the room. Now that's productivity loss!

The rules vary from place to place. But Alex Osborn's original four still work: 1) Don't allow criticism; 2) Encourage wild ideas; 3) Go for quantity; 4) Combine and/or improve on others' ideas. To steal from IDEO, I'd add "One conversation at a time" and "Stay focused on the topic," as both help save groups from dissolving into disorder. 



Feb 2 Task Accomplishment - 14 Team Task Roles

Team task roles are those roles that members assume, either consciously or unconsciously, that move the team forward in accomplishing its tasks and mission. These roles are of vital importance in good team functioning.


1. Initiator - suggests new ideas to the group
2. Information Seeker - seeks clarification of issues in terms of their factual adequacy
3. Opinion Seeker - seeks clarification of the values pertinent to the issue, rather than facts
4. Information Giver - offers facts or other "authoritative" information
5. Opinion Giver - offers beliefs or other value-based ideas
6. Elaborator - spells out suggestions in terms of examples or developed meanings
7. Summarizer - pulls together ideas, concepts, and group decisions to help the group identify where it is in its thinking
8. Coordinator-Integrator - clarifies and integrates relationships between various ideas, suggestions, and people
9. Orienter - defines the position of the group with respect to its goals
10. Disagreer - takes a different point of view, argues against, and implies error in fact or reasoning
11. Evaluator-Critic - subjects the accomplishment of the group to some set of standards. Questions the "practicality," the "logic," the "facts," or the "procedure"
12. Energizer - prods the group to action
13. Procedural Technician - performs routine tasks related to group functioning
14. Recorder - keeps a written record of the groups work

Monday, January 24, 2011

Jan 28 How to build a great team

Harmony. Cooperation. Synchronized effort. It's difficult, but it can be learned. Watch the great teams very closely - and then join one of your own.
By Jerry Useem, FORTUNE

(FORTUNE Magazine) - In 1972, a crack commando unit was sent to prison by a military court for a crime they didn't commit. These four men promptly escaped from a maximum-security stockade to the Los Angeles underground. Today, still wanted by the government, they survive as soldiers of fortune.
If you have a problem, if no one else can help, and if you can find them, maybe you can hire the A-Team.

The A-Team went off the air in 1987 - still wanted by the government - but television has never produced a better blueprint for team building. The key elements of its effectiveness: a cigar-chomping master of disguise, an ace pilot, a devilishly handsome con man, a mechanic with a mohawk and an amazingly sweet van.
Those particulars might not translate to all business settings. But clear definition of roles is a hallmark of effective collaboration. So is small team size - though four is slightly below the optimal number, 4.6. And the presence of an outside threat - like imminent recapture by government forces - likewise correlates with high team cohesion. To wit: France and England, which bloodied each other for centuries before they noticed ... Germany.
Another universal characteristic of teams is that they're, well, universal. If you work for a living, we're guessing you interact with other humans. (Lighthouse keepers, we'll see you next time.)
If you think this is mushy stuff, marginal to the daily battle of business, consider what is happening at Sony. CEO Howard Stringer and President Ryoji Chubachi are trying to restore the fighting spirit (and higher profits) at a company built on decentralized teams. Their theme: Sony United.
This issue also takes you deep inside a six-man team of Marines operating in Iraq; the team that built Motorola's RAZR phone; the cutthroat yet symbiotic pack of cyclists in the Tour de France; and the world of an open-source software company.
Each of these stories challenges a piece of conventional wisdom. If "hire great people" seems like unassailable advice, for example, then read Geoffrey Colvin's "Why Dream Teams Fail."
The fact is, most of what you've read about teamwork is bunk. So here's a place to start: Tear down those treacly motivational posters of rowers rowing and pipers piping. Gather every recorded instance of John Madden calling someone a "team player." Cram it all into a dumpster and light the thing on fire. Then settle in to really think about what it means to be a team.
We're certainly not against the concept of teamwork. But that's the point: All the happy-sounding twaddle obscures the actual practice of it. And teamwork is a practice. Great teamwork is an outcome; you can only create the conditions for it to flourish. Like getting rich or falling in love, you cannot simply will it to happen.
We will go further and say: Teamwork is an individual skill. That happens to be the title of a book. Christopher Avery writes, "Becoming skilled at doing more with others may be the single most important thing you can do" to increase your value - regardless of your level of authority.
As work is increasingly broken down into team-sized increments, Avery's argument goes, blaming a "bad team" for one's difficulties is, by definition, a personal failure, since the very notion of teamwork implies a shared responsibility. You can't control other people's behavior, but you can control your own. Which means that there is an "I" in team after all. (Especially in France, where they spell it Equipe.)
Yet this is not the selfish "I" that got so much attention during the "me" decade; it's the affiliatory "I" that built America's churches and fought its wars. Neil Armstrong didn't get to the moon through rugged individualism; there is no such thing as a self-made astronaut. "Men work together," wrote Robert Frost, "whether they work together or apart."
Here's both the problem and the promise of cooperation. Humans aren't hard-wired to succeed or fail at it. We can go either way. In her study of groupwork in school classrooms, the late Stanford sociologist Elizabeth Cohen found that if kids are simply put into teams and told to solve a problem, the typical result is one kid dominating and others looking totally disengaged.
But if teachers take the time to establish norms - roles, goals, etc. - "not only will [the children] behave according to the new norms, but they will enforce rules on other group members." Perhaps to a fault. "Even very young students," Cohen wrote, "can be heard lecturing to other members of the group on how they ought to be behaving."
Economists have long assumed that success boils down to personal incentives. We'll cooperate if it's in our self-interest, and we won't if it's not (sort of like lions). Then a team of researchers led by Linnda Caporael thought to ask: Would people cooperate without any incentives? The answer was--gasp!--yes, under the right conditions. Participants often cited "group welfare" as motivation.
To economists, shocking. To anyone who's been part of a successful team, not shocking at all. Life's richest experiences often happen in concert with others - your garage band, your wedding, tobogganing. The boss who assumes that workers' interests are purely mercenary will end up with a group of mercenaries.
No battery of team exercises can fix that situation - especially if they involve spanking your colleagues with yard signs. When a sales office of a home-security company, Alarm One, adopted that practice, a 53-year-old employee later sued for emotional distress. (A jury awarded her $1.2 million in April.)
Again, let the greats show the way. During a public appearance in 2000, an A-Team cast member was asked by a fan to name his favorite co-star. "Listen," Mr. T responded. "That's wrong for me to pick a favorite, because I'm a team player and we were a team. Remember, they say"--here it comes again--"there's no 'I' in team." No, but there is a "T." And pity the fool who forgets it.

Jan 28 Hot Groups "With Attitude": A New Organizational State of Mind


Hot Groups "With Attitude":
A New Organizational State of Mind
  
Jean Lipman-Blumen                    Harold J. Leavitt          



Today's organizations need, not more teams, but more "hot groups," goal-focused, impassioned managers and employees who can turn on a dime and create great things fast.
Organizations today don't just need more groups, they need more hot groups.  Organizational survival now demands speed flexibility and creativity.  Large organizations are notoriously bad at those.  Hot Groups are very good at all three.  They can turn on a dime and create great things fast.  "Hot Group" is not a name for another kind of team, like self-managed or cross functional-teams.  Such teams might become hot groups, but few of them do.  A hot group is a plural state of mind, not a structural unit; it is a shared attitude obsessed with and deeply dedicated to its task, an attitude that could infect any group, no matter what its name.  It is always accompanied by a sense of mission, of urgent purpose in almost all other respects, hot groups may vary enormously.  Their members can be diverse or homogeneous, brilliant or average, young or old, or both.
Any group can become a hot group if it can get itself into that distinctive state of mind.  A few groups currently called "teams" manage to do that, but the great majority don't.  Some "task forces" and other variously labeled groups also heat up, but most don't.  It is not the groups name, but the contagious single-mindedness and the all-out dedication to doing something important that distinguish hot groups from all other groups.
A challenging task and an accompanying sense of mission are always characteristic of the hot group predilection.  The words of some hot group veterans communicate that disposition far better than we can.  Here are a few quotes from members of several different kinds of hot groups:
This is Bill Gates' description of the programming group he belonged to before the birth of Microsoft, as Robert Cringely reports it in his Triumph of the Nerds:
"We didn't even obey a 24-hour clock.  We'd come in and program for a couple days straight, we'd - you know four or five of us - when it was time to eat, we'd get in our cars and kind of race over to the restaurant and sit and talk about what we were doing. Some times I'd get (so) excited about things.  I'd forget to eat.  Then we'd go back and program some more.  Those were also the fun days."
Here is an aerospace executive, as he recaptured the culture of a project team he worked on in the mid 1990s:
"We even walked differently than anybody else.  We felt we were way out there, ahead of the whole world."
This is Emmy award-winning actress Barbara Babcock recalling the working atmosphere during the production of the 1980s acclaimed television series Hill Street Blues:
"Everybody was involved in that show.  We actors didn't just read our lines.  We worked on the whole show with the writers and directors....  We knew we were doing something wonderful, something innovative and important."
Here, Robert Kennedy, in Thirteen Days, describes the working style of the "ExCom," the ad hoc crisis management group advising President John F. Kennedy in October, 1962, during the tense 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis:
"During all these deliberations, we all spoke as equals.  There was no rank, and, in fact, we did not even have a chairman....As a result, with the encouragement of McNamara, Bundy, and Ball, the conversations were completely uninhibited....Everyone had an equal opportunity to express himself and to be heard directly.  It was a tremendously advantageous procedure that does not frequently occur within the executive branch of the government, where rank is often so important."
This is how Steven Levy, in his book, Insanely Great, reports John Sculley's description of the Macintosh design group as Sculley first encountered it, just after he joined young Apple Computer in the early 1980s:
"It was almost as though there were magnetic fields, some spiritual force, mesmerizing people.  Their eyes were just dazed.  Excitement showed on everyone's face.  It was nearly a cult environment."
Sculley was wrong about the last part of that statement.  That hot group state of mind is about as far from a cult mindset as anyone can imagine.  Cults demand conformity and uniformity.  They require "groupthink." Hot group members are anything but conformists.  They thrive on outspoken debate and disagreement.
Hot groups, as these examples suggest, are often professionally, socially, and even intellectually diverse.  They need not be composed of geniuses, although there is certainly nothing to prevent such virtuosi from participating-so long as their egos don't blow a group to pieces.  Members' IQs are simply unrelated to group heat.  So are personality, social rank, professional status, race, gender, and political affiliation.  A street corner gang of school dropouts could be a hot group, while a set of Nobelists in economics might well be ice cold.
The Gates group was a turned-on collection of deeply committed, bright youngsters, confident that they were on the trail of something great.  And they were.
The aerospace team was quite homogeneous; a set of engineers and technologists of more or less similar backgrounds, working within a large company.
The Hill Street Blues group was also a company, but in the original sense of that word. It, as a temporary assemblage engaged in a common task, a company composed of actors, directors, producers, and camera people who had come together to engage in a specific, relatively short-term undertaking.  It was a highly diverse group.  Some members were probably brilliant, and some were not.  Some were bigger shots in the entertainment industry than others.  Some thought first about art, others about money.
President Kennedy's ExCom was intentionally heterogeneous, although all of its members were experienced senior public officials working within the context of a much larger bureaucracy.
The Mac group was made up of a gaggle of brash and brilliant young Northern California computer jocks, working in a struggling but confident new enterprise.
Those hot groups differed greatly from one another.  Their members varied on virtually every dimension: age, intelligence, occupation, race, education, status, and gender.  Some groups were diverse, others homogeneous.  Some were quite autonomous, others operated within tight hierarchical constraints.  They went by different names, from "team" to "committee" to "company." The Gates and Macintosh groups had no special names.  They were just collections of imaginative and dedicated young people.  Yet, all those groups together represent only a narrow sample of the wide range of sizes, shapes, times, and places in which one can find hot groups.
All these examples, however, share some core characteristics of the hot group state of mind.
Each group felt itself engaged in an important, even vital, personally stretching, ennobling mission.  No matter how trivial their work may appear to outsiders, hot group members always see distinction and meaning in their undertakings.
In each case, the task captivated its members, temporarily monopolizing every heart and mind to the exclusion of almost everything else.  The process was simultaneously arduous and intoxicating.
Contrary to some fundamental tenets of organization development theory, interpersonal relationships played only secondary roles.
As is the nature of most hot groups, all our examples were relatively short-lived, yet each is remembered nostalgically and in considerable detail by its participants.
Two other important points: First, the fact that several individuals have worked together as a hot group in one venture does not mean that they will generate similar heat every time they collaborate.  The Hill Street Blues company heated up, but many of the same participants, working together in later productions, did not strike any particular sparks.
Second, the same individuals who have failed to heat up at one task can learn from that experience and ignite one another.  A notable hot group of experienced veterans of politics and diplomacy stumbled disastrously in the Bay of Pigs debacle.  Yet President Kennedy's later ExCom, composed of many of the same individuals, performed brilliantly in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
TEAMS ARE A JAPANESE IMPORT; HOT GROUPS ARE AS AMERICAN AS SILICON VALLEY.
The team wave, as we have come to know it in American organizations, is the child of a mixed marriage.  It was born of then enormously successful Japanese management practice coupled with 1950s American research about the dynamics of groups.  We came to believe that those Japanese manufacturing achievements were due, in large part, to their effective use of small groups--or so said several best-selling American books about Japanese management styles.  Some U.S. companies, therefore, flew their people to Kyoto whence they returned with group techniques such as quality circles.  They introduced these methods into American plants from Wichita to Jersey City, with varying degrees of success.
The American portion of that team movement emerged from the re-discovery of a largely untapped backlog of Western academic research on group dynamics--the core of which was initiated at MIT in the late 1940s and 50s.  It took the Japanese economic invasion decades later to make companies begin to pay attention to those early findings.  The applied specialty called "organizational development" was deeply rooted in that small group theory, so "OD" then began to be taken more seriously by American organizations.
Hot groups, in contrast, are the offspring of all-American parents.  They came in via the audacious upstart start-ups of Northern California' s Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128.  Their arrival had very little to do with either Japan or OD.  They burst onto the stage with a brash bang, not on a slow boat from Asia.  They were focused on ideas and work, not relationships and emotionality.
The founders of many of those little startup entities-"organizations" is too formal a label for most of them--belonged to the irreverent, anti-establishment generation of the sixties.  They were veterans of campus unrest, the Vietnam years, and the sexual revolution; the generation that deeply distrusted traditional institutions.  Their people had never worn gray flannel suits or been apprenticed at Procter and Gamble or IBM.  They were 180 degrees removed from the classic organization man.  Indeed, and not surprisingly, some of them were women.

AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS BOUGHT INTO JAPANESE TEAMS BUT DISDAINED HOME-GROWN HOT GROUPS.
Our Western organizations quickly embraced the Japanese team approach, but they showed no love at all for those little hot groups that were springing up much closer to home.  Why such selective attraction? Was it because we didn't yet feel the build up of pressure for more speed and innovation? Or because we didn't yet appreciate the acceleration of change, even though much of it had been generated by the new information technology pouring out of that same Silicon Valley?
Was it because Japanese-style teams were fairly easy to incorporate into existing organizational architectures? Teams were only mildly disturbing to the hierarchical status quo.  They could be designed and controlled from higher up.  They might even serve as a deterrent to unionization.
Hot groups were another matter, decidedly unlike teams.  They disturbed the established order.  If stability and uniformity were to remain organizational holy grails, hot groups were just what they didn't want.  Hot groups signaled risk, variability, and continual change.
When organizations first met up with hot groups, therefore, they behaved in one of two ways: Either they laughed them off as trivial "children's crusades," as was the case with Apple's Macintosh group, or else they did what they had always done to those few hot groups that dared to sprout in their well ordered gardens: They treated them as noxious weeds and killed them off.

HOT GROUPS IN LITTLE EMERGING ENTERPRISES WERE CHURNING UP THE INFORMATIONAL FLOOD THAT WOULD SOON ENGULF THE BIG BOYS.
Even as most large organizations were seeking shelter from the Japanese typhoon via, among other things, teams, some of those entrepreneurial little outfits were generating even more threatening challenges to thestatus quo.  They were creating an information revolution.  And they were doing a lot of it mostly with natural hot groups, not management-manufactured teams.  Hot groups had several characteristics that those unconventional startups loved and prized: speed, flexibility, innovativeness, enthusiasm, and unbounded bravado.  Even now, don't we often associate hot groups with young institutions and young people? Unfettered by bulk and historical baggage, small, youthful "organizations" could exploit the exhilaration of the hot group.  Fortuitously, perhaps, it all happened at a moment in history when the open, task-obsessed style of Silicon Valley meshed beautifully with the accelerating, impermanent demands of the new organizational game.
The names of this new organizational game are "speed" and "innovation." Those require much more than ongoing, productive teams.  They require more than self-managed work groups or cross-functional task forces.  They require impassioned, task-focused hot groups.  Still, for many organizations that cannot yet tolerate even individual wild ducks, the transition to whole flocks of them will not come easily.

HOT GROUPS.  WHY NOW?
In the past, organizations seemed to get along quite well without hot groups.  Is now so different from then? Emphatically, yes! Back then, stability was more vital than speed, order more than innovation, predictability more than change.  The volatile new world has forced a near reversal of those priorities. Speed, creativity, change--these are the new demands of our era.
The new environmental pressures are unlikely to end now that they have begun.  We are not heading toward some new equilibrium, some boundless oasis at which organizations will be able to refresh and tell themselves, "OK.  We've changed what needed to be changed. Now we can get back to regular business." There is no regular business any more.  The hectic exercise of coping with volatile, mostly unpredictable and lightning-fast change will not decelerate.  In fact, the basic life patterns of those new world organizations are likely to mirror the life patterns of hot groups.  Like hot groups, larger organizations will be innovating, producing, and then disappearing over relatively brief lifetimes, leaving little detritus in their wakes.
The turbulent global environment is not the only force pressing organizations to change.  Inside pressures are building almost as fast.  This generation's people will no longer permit themselves to be depersonalized as "human resources." That was an unfortunate phrase when it arrived 20 or so years ago, and it is even more inappropriate now.  Nor is the phrase "knowledge workers" an adequate successor.  People working in the new world's organizations are, or should be, "complete" workers.  They work with their hands, their heads, their beliefs, their total personae, and with one another.  For such people, the old "be good, do as your told, and wait for your promotion," is as "retro" as saddle shoes.
Our new people want and deserve challenge, growth, and meaning from their work.  More than ever, in this era of rising expectations, organizational members are asking themselves tough questions: What do we really want out of our careers? What makes us feel fulfilled? Why does each of us want so much to be valued as a unique and significant individual?
Psychologists, among others, have tried to approach such questions by positing concepts like needs, drives, andmotives.  David McClelland, for example, long ago measured individuals' needs for achievement, power, and affiliation.  Abraham Maslow offered his hierarchy, from physical needs to self-actualization needs.  More recently, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi developed the idea of flow, a more cognitive concept, describing the human sense of moving forward, of accomplishing things worth accomplishing. "The best moments [in life] usually occur," he writes, "when a person's body or mind is stretched to its limits in a voluntary effort to accomplish something difficult and worthwhile."
Hot groups give individuals opportunities to stretch beyond the usual limits, to move forward, voluntarily, in a collegial effort to do something great.  Hot groups don't help individuals satisfy all their needs, drives, and motives, but they can certainly give us chances to strive toward those high-relief, "peak experiences."
WATCH OUT!  HOT GROUPS CAN EVEN GROW IN AUSTERE, HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATIONS.
Organizations knew what they were doing when they tried to kill off nascent hot groups.  Hot groups may look like innocent Christmas tree ornaments, but they're really more like live hand grenades, potentially explosive and portending serious organizational upheaval.  So, should you encounter a little hot group somewhere inside an otherwise traditional, formalistic organization, at least one of these four conditions is also likely to prevail:

1) The organization doesn't yet know the group is there.  If it finds out, it will try to kill it.  Thus, in a large government-sponsored research organization, several different project managers told us how they "protected" certain groups' activities.  They used devices like setting aside some of last year's budget to fund non-approved, current hot projects.  They found ingenious ways to keep needed people, even when they had been ordered to reduce personnel.  They might, for example, lay employees off, then immediately rehire them as temporaries for the maximum of 364 days, then give them a day off, then hire them again for another 364 days.  Legal? Probably.  Ethical? Not so clear.  Hot groups often skirt the edges of the rule book.  Those R&D directors didn't do those things for personal gain.  They did them to get good work done.  Could any large bureaucracy function if its people played strictly by every mindless rule? Remember the chaos that resulted from work-to-rule" strikes, when employees did just what the book specified--and no more?

2) The CEO or some other senior patron is the "eminence grise" behind the group, supporting and protecting it.  Perhaps that patron feels the group has spotted a highly promising project.  Or perhaps he or she is intentionally using the hot group as a change agent to awaken the whole sleeping giant.  By itself, that tactic has about a 50/50 chance of working.  It will surely upset the organizational equilibrium, but from there onward it may go either way, in the intended direction or some quite unintended one.
Here is one case where a chairman's use of a hot group paid off:
A large, conservative engineering firm that we'll call "A&B Engineering" was known for doing first-class work and was also generally viewed as rather old fashioned and slow-moving.  The executive offices on the 10th floor of its headquarters were imposing, thickly carpeted, hushed.  The food in the executive dining room was worthy of at least one Michelin star.  Executive seniority averaged well over 20 years.  Turnover was almost non-existent.  As far back as anyone could remember, promotions had come entirely from within.  The firm was a safe, comfortable haven in which senior executives could pass their golden years.  This was not a milieu for noisy, ill-disciplined hot groups!
Then, quite unexpectedly, the chairman made a radical and unprecedented move.  Concerned about his organization's future, he recruited two newly retired military engineering officers directly into the company's upper ranks.  By A&B standards, they were young. They, in turn, brought along a small, even younger cadre of their former military mates.
This new group was given lots of leeway by the chairman.  It soon heated up.  Its members quickly moved into strategic positions in the key divisions of the company.  Wherever they went, they infused a sense of energy and urgency.  The not-yet-suppressed junior engineers were turned on by these lively new arrivals.  Nirvana had fin8llv been reached! Ideas, long withheld or ignored, came bubbling to the surface.
The veteran seniors did not view the new group in the same way.  They felt threatened, and they were angry.  Among themselves, they dubbed the new arrivals the "Military Mafia." But their obvious disapproval only seemed to turn up the Mafia's thermostat.
Despite rising tensions, the patron/chairman held his ground.  He gave the "Mafiosi" lots of space.  The whole culture of the company began to shift in a more spirited, more pro-active direction.  The Mafia itself, in the manner characteristic of hot groups, eventually broke up.  Its members metamorphosed into individual managers of various divisions.  By then, however, the organization had clearly changed.

3) A major crisis is at hand, so normal regulations and procedures have been temporarily suspended.  In desperation, the organization is willing to tolerate almost anything, even hot groups.  Crises are frequently crucibles for the formation of hot groups.  World War II generated them by the hundreds: the British code breakers, for example, and the nuclear physicists working beneath the stands of Chicago Stadium, along with numberless military and underground paramilitary groups.
In industrial crises, too, hot groups form.  In the 1970s, when several bottles of Tylenol had been poisoned, Johnson and Johnson transformed itself into a whole network of hot groups.  The near disaster of the Apollo 13 crisis also quickly formed super-heated group after group associated with NASA.

4) The organization's core values, especially truth-seeking values, provide a supportive surrounding for hot groups.  Organizations like 3-M and the old Bell Labs are neither small nor young, nor are they unusually humanistic, yet lots of hot groups have flourished within them.  What such organizations share is a culture that values the search for truth even more than the requirements of bureaucracy.  Often it is a "culture of science" with deeply embedded beliefs about objectivity and high tolerance for off-center ways of thinking that pervades such organizations.
Both of the authors used to work with Bell Labs, before the AT&T break-up.  BTL was no small, blue-leaned, Silicon Valley parvenu.  One of many seemingly conservative units of old Ma Bell, it was a mature company, with more than twenty thousand employees.  We counted nine levels in the hierarchy.  BTL was also a polite, gentlemanly place.  No one was ever "fired" from the Bell Telephone Laboratories.  People were "stimulated"--to go elsewhere.
That would seem the wrong soil in which to grow hot groups, except for one all encompassing attribute: BTL's widely shared and tenaciously-held truth-seeking values. Those core scientific values underlay every aspect of Bell Labs.  From its beginnings, the organization had been designed as a house of science.
While BTL thus wore all the trappings of a classic bureaucracy, its values were similar to those of a graduate department in a good university.  A new Ph.D.  in electrical engineering, fresh out of Stanford or MIT, could blend into Bell Labs with hardly a ripple.  Those recruits' new bosses were just like the professors back at school, with credentials at least as impressive as those of their academic peers.  Like their professors, these new patrons demanded the same discipline and responsibility, even as they encouraged the same creativity and inter-communication.
Moreover, the highest status in the organization went to the people in basic research, the ones doing the most far out, "impractical" work.  In many other companies, those folks, if there were any, would have been irrelevant to the real power structure of the organization.
Thus, despite BTL's otherwise rather stodgy, hierarchical, and bureaucratic structure, hot groups flourished, making one scientific or technical breakthrough after another.
CAN HOT GROUPS LIVE IN COLD ORGANIZATIONS?  LET US COUNT SOME WAYS.
There is a broad and basic mismatch between the structures and norms of traditional organizations and those of hot groups. Organizations think "individual," while hot groups think "group." Organizations value order and regularity.  Hot groups value freedom and creativity. Organizations like predictability and permanence.  Hot groups thrive on uncertainty and change.  Large organizations need clear rules and controls.  Hot groups prefer spontaneity. They like to make up the game as they go.  Yet, despite the differences, accommodations are possible.  The marriage can even be fruitful.
Here are a few ways that organizational leaders might encourage and support the development of hot groups.
  • Think "group" more; think "individual" less.  Most managers, especially those in large old organizations, not only think engineering, they also think individual.  They hire and fire individuals, promote individuals, evaluate individuals, and reward individuals.  That intense focus on individuals causes trouble for groups, engendering intra-group jealousies, competitions, and divisions.  Certainly individual rewards are needed, but let it be the group that decides how to do it.  It is group members who know better than anyone, which of their colleagues have and have not contributed to the group's performance.
  • Let individualism reign within hot groups. For individuals, also caught in this whirling new world, hot groups provide a much needed refuge; not the lotus blossom refuge of tranquillity, but a refuge of opportunity, a refuge from the wheel-spinning anomie of "normal" organizational life.  Hot groups give the individual, in ways both large and small, a chance to escape into adventure, to set sail, with a small crew of committed others, onto uncharted seas in search of wondrous discoveries.  To the outside world, some of those quests may seem trivial.  Who cares? In the eye of the hot group beholders, their pursuits always glow with promise.  Every working human being deserves such a chance to reach for a star.  If limits must be set, those inside the hot group know better than outsiders where and how to set them.
  • Don't dis-organize, but do un-organize! Organizations like to organize.  They build formal structures, draw organization charts, and design complex control systems.  Some varieties of teams and committees may actually flourish in such milieu, but hot groups won't.  They need challenge more than routine, nurturing more than control, freedom more than structure.  Those are what many small, new organizations can frequently offer, in part because they do not yet suffer from organizational arthritis.  Ergo, if large organizations can act more like small ones, hot groups might feel more welcome.To unorganize is not to disorganize.  Good farmers are hardly disorganized.  They know what they are doing and how to do it.  But they don't know just how many peas will turn up in every pod.
    It's not anarchy we're seeking.  It's what Professors (Michael) Cohen and (James) March once calledorganized anarchy.  We still need some order, some structure, and some control.  Now, however, is the time for organizations to give their people more space, to leave some things to nature--human nature--rather than seeking always to program the hitherto unprogrammable.
BEYOND THESE, ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO REMEMBER:
  • When hot group seedlings sprout, feed and nurture them.  Keep an eye out for them and an eye on them, but don't play psychiatrist.  They can take care of most of their own social and psychological problems.
  • Emphasize selection, de-emphasize training.  Look for imaginative, task-focused people.  Spend less effort teaching those people how to do things the company way.
  • Loosen controls as much as you can. Micro-managing stifles hot groups.  Give them resources: space, time, and discretion.  A little extra budget doesn't hurt either.
  • Extend the span of control.  Don't reduce it.  You can supervise more hot groups because they're self regulating.
  • Don't conduct elaborate, individual performance evaluations.  Ask yourself if individual performance evaluations do any good.  In fact, consider whether you really need any formal individual performance evaluations at all.  Put more emphasis on informal feedback.
  • If you want an organization chart, make it look more like a map of Boston than a neat pyramid.  Specifying "proper channels" slows communication flows and impedes innovation.
  • Periodically, push the throttle up to full speed.  Remember, however, that keeping it there all the time can cause burnout.

If you do all those things, hot groups will probably grow profusely.  The more, the better.  Be prepared, however, to make appropriate adjustments because hot groups can cause fallout.  Hot groups with "attitude" can spark resentment.  Their demands may sometimes seem excessive.  Some will fail.  But on balance, the payoffs far exceed the costs.
A caveat: Looseness and openness, in and of themselves, are far from sufficient. Some loose, open organizations are laissez-faire places, casual and unhurried.  Hot groups don't do well in such summer resort cultures.  They prefer the tension and exhilaration of white-water rafting to lying around by the pool.  So it is not surprising that they frequently pop up in new, still-pliable, do-or-die young organizations, only to disappear as success generates caution, and venture capitalists insist that it's time to "get organized." Routinization is a systemic poison for hot groups.  It kills both their freedom and their fight.
SUMMING UP:
Here is why we believe most organizations now, in this era of impermanence, need more hot groups:
  • Contemporary organizations would be wrong to await some new haven of peace and quiet when the storm of change ends.  This storm won't end.  Comforting normalcy is simply not in the cards.
  • The small group, more than the individual, is fast becoming the basic building block of new organizational structures-except the word "block" is too static.  It implies solidity and permanence.  The new groups will be neither solid nor permanent.  They will be dynamic and transient.  The tasks of the new world are already too big and too interconnected, even for brilliant individuals.
  • To cope with increasing environmental turbulence, large organizations are already trying to act more like small ones--to become more nimble, innovative, and continuously self-modifying.  They are much more willing to combine, subdivide, form alliances, absorb pieces of one another, and spin off chunks of themselves.  As they grow bigger, they try to act smaller.  Hot groups-fast, fluid, and deft--are a great device for doing that.
  • Small groups imbued with that urgent, dedicated hot-group state of mind are one of the few psychological linchpins that can connect our new people to our ever-more massive organizations and these organizations to the swirling world beyond.
  • Hot groups, strangely enough, also provide a support system for individualism.  They allow space for those individual eccentricities that organizations profess to value but so often reject.  More than that, hot groups draw their nutriment from creative individualism.
So the time has come, we repeat, for big, often cold organizations to start seeding, feeding, weeding, and harvesting small hot groups.  Hot groups are right for modern organizations, and, thank heavens, they are also good for the hearts and minds of human beings.

Jan 28 Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances - The Five Keys to Successful Teams

Harvard professor J. Richard Hackman has studied the secrets of effective teams ranging from airplane cockpit crews to musical ensembles. He believes that corporate leaders can create better teamwork within their own organizations by adopting five key concepts. Read an excerpt from Hackman's new book,Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances. Plus: Q&A with the author.

In Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances, J. Richard Hackman lays out five conditions necessary for successful teamwork: The team must be a real team, rather than a team in name only; it has compelling direction for its work; it has an enabling structure that facilitates teamwork; it operates within a supportive organizational context; and it has expert teamwork coaching.
Hackman discusses the role of leadership in establishing and fostering teams in this e-mail interview with HBS Working Knowledge'sMallory Stark.
Stark: What can leaders do to foster the five conditions (see above) you say are critical for teamwork?
Hackman: The simple answer is that leaders should do anything they appropriately can to get the conditions in place—there is no "one right way" to do so. But beyond that simple answer is a second set of requirements that are not always easy to fulfill. Leaders who succeed in creating conditions for team effectiveness, one, need to know some things; two, need to know how to do some things; and three, need an above-average level of emotional maturity and political acumen.

Need to know some things. As I point out in my book, a great deal of conventional wisdom about what it takes to foster team effectiveness is, to put it bluntly, wrong. Most of us believe that "harmony helps performance," for example, or that "bigger is better," or that "teams need a constant flow-through of new members to stay fresh." Our research findings provide an alternative to conventional wisdom, one that views the leader's job as, first of all, getting those five conditions in place, and then doing whatever the leader can do to strengthen them and to help teams take good advantage of them.
This requires some depth of knowledge about what those conditions are and why they provide a solid platform for group development and performance.
Need to know how to do some things. There are real skills involved in creating the key conditions for effectiveness. For example, take "establish a compelling direction for the team." Creating this condition requires much more than merely writing out a vision statement and giving it to the team. Leaders often err either by giving teams too much direction (for example, telling them not only what they are to accomplish but all the details about how they are to go about accomplishing it) or too little (for example, giving merely a vague description of the team's purposes and leaving it to the team to "work out the details"). Setting good direction for a team means being authoritative and insistent about desired end states, but being equally insistent about not specifying how the team should go about achieving those end-states. This requires some skill and, unfortunately, it is not the kind of skill commonly taught in MBA classrooms or executive leadership programs. Similar skill requirements also hold for the other four conditions.
Emotional maturity and political acumen. One usually cannot establish the conditions for effectiveness on the leader's own schedule. Trying to force a condition when the time is not right almost never works. This means that leaders, like hungry lions, must lie in wait for the right time—and then, when it is right, pounce. To wait for the right time, especially when things seem to be getting worse rather than better, requires no small measure of emotional maturity.
Sometimes there is no prospect that organizational circumstances will become more amenable to creating the key conditions. In those circumstances, leaders must draw on their political skills—identifying the people or groups whose cooperation is needed to move forward, and then finding ways to get their interests aligned with the leader's own so that constructive change can begin. In the book, I give lots of examples of how leaders in various industries have done this while still maintaining their personal and professional integrity.
Q: Once managers have established the five conditions, what are the biggest challenges faced by most team leaders?
A: You are right that getting the conditions in place should be the first priority. After that, two challenges surface. The first challenge is to keep those conditions in place (and then, ideally, to strengthen them), which can be no small matter in organizations that traditionally have been designed and managed to support and control work performed by individuals rather than teams. Constant vigilance is needed to make sure that well-intentioned colleagues who are responsible for other functions, such as human resources, technology, or reward system experts, do not inadvertently compromise the key conditions as they seek to achieve the highest level of professionalism in their own areas.

The second challenge for leaders is to help teams take the fullest possible advantage of their favorable performance circumstances. In Chapter 6 of the book, I discuss team coaching at some length, and how different coaching functions—such as building team motivation, consulting to the team about its work strategy, and helping members harvest and use the lessons learned from their collective work—are best done at different times in the team life cycle. Leaders can do a great deal to help teams exploit the positive potential of a well-designed structure and context.
Q: Where do most organizations fall down in terms of creating a good team structure?
A: The three most common problems we have encountered are these. First, failing to be clear enough about who is on the team (members cannot collectively take responsibility for the team outcome if they do not know for sure just who they are) and failing to provide enough stability of membership so that members can learn how best to work together. Well designed teams learn quickly how to work well together, and they get better and better over time. But not if team membership is ambiguous or constantly in flux.
Second, failing to provide a clear, challenging, and consequential direction for the team. In the interest of "participative management," organizational leaders sometimes back off from authoritatively specifying a team's purposes; or because they are worried about how well the team will do, they sometimes assign the team only a small and relatively inconsequential part of the overall task that needs to be performed. Those are perverse mistakes, since having a vague or relatively unimportant piece of work to do actually compromises team performance. Team empowerment rarely comes from long and seemingly democratic discussions about what teams' purposes should be. As I said earlier, it comes instead from establishing a direction for the team that is clear, challenging (with no guarantee of success!) and highly consequential for the organization or its clients.

Third, composing teams that are too large and too homogeneous in membership. My rule of thumb is that no work team should have membership in the double digits (and my preferred size is six), since our research has shown that the number of performance problems a team encounters increases exponentially as team size increases. Homogeneity of membership is a frequent problem because each of us works most easily and comfortably with people like ourselves. I would no doubt get along very well in a group whose other members also are middle-aged white male pipe-smoking professors. We might very much enjoy our time together. But our creativity would be higher if our group had a diverse mix of members—people who have real substantive differences in their views about how the work should be structured and executed. It is task-related conflict, not interpersonal harmony, that spurs team excellence.
There are other pitfalls as well, of course, a number of which have to do with the supportiveness of the organizational context within which the team works. For example, whether the reward system recognizes and reinforces team, as opposed to individual, excellence; whether the team members can get access to the information and resources they need for their collective work, and so on. But the three just listed are the most frequent problems we observed in how leaders structured the team itself.
Q: Your research focused on real-time teams such as cockpit crews and musical ensembles. Such teams have little room for trial and error. Is your work translatable to teams in less real-time environments?
A: Yes. I've given a good deal of research attention to real-time teams for two reasons. First, I find them fascinating. There is a real excitement to observing a team whose members know that they have to get it right the first time, that they cannot go back and try again if things do not go well. The more important reason for studying such teams is that they set a high hurdle for assessing the quality and usefulness of our findings. If we can learn what it takes for success in a highly demanding situation where there is no room for error, then surely the findings should apply as well to teams that do have the chance to redo their work if it does not come out well the first time around. I've enjoyed the challenge of trying to generate research findings that can be helpful to teams and leaders in the most stringent and consequential performance circumstances.
Q: What were the biggest surprises that you encountered in your work on teams?
A: The biggest surprise also was an unhappy one: how incredibly under-utilized members' talents were in most of the teams we studied. There were some exceptions, of course, such as the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, which scoops up and uses every scrap of musical and leadership talent that exists within the ensemble. But most teams, including senior executive teams, generally leave untapped enormous pools of member talent. The main contribution I hope my book makes is to help team leaders and members learn how to better harness and focus members' talents in carrying out the team's work—and to do so in a way that strengthens the team itself as a performing unit and that contributes to the ongoing learning and growth of individual team members.

by J. Richard Hackman
The conditions that foster team effectiveness are simple and seemingly straightforward to put in place. Yet, as we have seen, creating these simple conditions can be a daunting undertaking in many work organizations, something that cannot be accomplished either as an "add on" (as managers in some corporations appear to wish) or as a one-step transition to utopia (as members of some cooperative enterprises appear to wish).
Implementing self-managing work teams in a stable organization that has been fine-tuned to support and control individual work behavior is in some ways like introducing a foreign substance into a healthy biological system: The antibodies come out and take care of the intruder. There may be a bit of fever and discomfort along the way, but eventually things return to normal. The same is true for social systems. Small difficulties are dealt with routinely, without entertaining the possibility that they may be signaling a larger organizational malady. Only when things get so bad that a system's very survival is threatened do leaders (sometimes) take the actions that might fundamentally change how that system operates. 16
At risk of inviting incredulity on the part of colleagues who actually do research on organizational change processes (and who have developed thoughtful and practical guides for planned change), let me offer here my very own change model. Intended specifically for use when implementing work teams in organizations, my model has but two steps: (1) Be prepared. (2) Lie in wait.
Being Prepared. When a usually closed door opens, one must be ready to walk through it without delay. Organizational doors do open on occasion, but they may not stay that way very long. This means that those who wish to introduce fundamental changes in how work is accomplished in an organization (and I hope I've already convinced you that creating and supporting work teams usually does involve fundamental change) must be prepared so that when the time is right, they can initiate action swiftly and competently.
Preparation is real work. It involves study, to be sure—thinking, reading, visiting other organizations where teams are used, attending management seminars and conferences, and doing whatever else one can do to expand and deepen one's knowledge of the best ways to create, support, and lead work teams. But it also involves imaginative work—envisioning what might be created, what the teams would do, how they would be set up and led, and all the other matters we have explored in this book. And, finally, it involves political action—sharing with others one's vision of how teams would work and what they could accomplish, building a coalition of organization members who are prepared to support that vision, and taking initiatives to align the interests of powerful and potentially skeptical others whose cooperation will be necessary to launch and sustain work teams. 17
It is hard to take advantage of an emergent opportunity if one has not already thought through what one seeks to accomplish, developed an image of the desired end state that can be readily apprehended and appreciated by others, and lined up the key individuals and groups who can help make the vision a reality. When preparation has been done well, the network of individuals who will make the change happen is in place and ready. Then, when the time is right, the network can be activated and change processes can begin in earnest. One does not set out on a planned sailing trip when the weather is bad. Instead, one makes sure that the boat is ready, the crew is ready, and the intended course and destination are understood by all. And then, when the weather breaks, one can say, "OK, we can go now," and be off the dock within the hour.
Excerpted with permission from Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances, Harvard Business School Press, 2002.
Lying in wait
Sigmund Freud once said, "He who knows how to wait need make no concessions." To make compromise after compromise so that one can proceed immediately to initiate change can erode one's aspiration almost beyond recognition. That is why work teams sometimes turn out to be teams in name only—getting them implemented requires making so many concessions that one winds up with work units that are called teams but that actually do not much differ from what already exists. To wait until the time is right, on the other hand, offers at least the possibility of a fundamental alteration in how work is construed and accomplished.
One of the great features of work organizations for those who aspire to change them is that it is rarely a long wait for something to happen that destabilizes the system and thereby offers an opening for change. Perhaps a senior manager leaves. Or an organizational unit enters a period of rapid growth or belt-tightening. Or one organizational unit is merged with another. Or the entire organization acquires, or is acquired by, another. Or financial disaster seems about to descend upon the enterprise. Or a new technology is introduced that requires abandonment of standard ways of operating. All of these, and more, offer opportunities for change: The balls go up in the air, and the prepared leader brings them back down in another, better configuration. 19
All systems regularly move back and forth between periods of relative stability and periods of turbulence, and it is during the turbulent times that change occurs. Learning and change almost never occur gradually and continuously, with each small step followed by yet another small forward step. Instead, an extended period when nothing much seems to be happening is followed by a period of rapid and multidimensional change, and then by yet another period during which no visible changes are occurring. This pattern is called punctuated equilibrium, and it characterizes the evolution of the species, human development, adult learning and organizational change.20 Wise leaders, recognizing that change initiatives during periods of equilibrium have little chance of making much of a difference, watch and wait for the times of punctuation. They know that during turbulent times major interventions have a greater chance of success and that even small changes may yield disproportionately large effects.
Like preparation, waiting is work. One feels as if nothing is happening and, worse, that no one is doing anything constructive to stem further organizational deterioration. Anxious leaders cannot bear the wait, initiate change too soon, and fail to achieve their aspirations. Change-savvy leaders wait.
Forcing the issue
Sometimes leaders decide that the wait for turbulence is taking too long and toss a few balls into the air themselves, personally manufacturing a bit of chaos in hopes of creating just enough instability to give change a chance. Theater director Anne Bogart occasionally does that when stymied by an artistic problem during rehearsal:
Right there, in that moment, in that rehearsal, I have to say, "I know!" and start walking toward the stage. During the crisis of the walk, something musthappen: some insight, some idea. The sensation of this walk to the stage, to the actors, feels like falling into a treacherous abyss. The walk creates a crisis in which innovation must happen, invention must transpire. I create the crisis in rehearsal to get out of my own way. I create despite myself and my limitations and my hesitancy. In unbalance and falling lie the potential of creation. When things start to fall apart in rehearsal, the possibility of creation exists. 21
It is tempting to exhort organizational managers to follow Bogart's courageous lead and take action that hastens the arrival of turbulence, thereby allowing change to occur sooner rather than later. Political revolutionaries regularly do this to accelerate the fall of a regime that is viewed as undesirable. Organizational leaders would never condone subversion, inciting public disobedience, or promoting violence to bring their enterprises to a state of readiness for change, of course. But they do the organizational equivalent of those political acts when they take actions that cannot be ignored and that make it literally impossible for the system to continue on its present path.
Examples abound. The executive team leader described in Chapter 7 eliminated a significant number of jobs and then allowed incumbents to apply for newly defined roles in a reconfigured organization. Other leaders may choose to impose a significant across-the-board budget cut. Although purportedly done to achieve cost savings, the more important function of large budget cuts may be to force everyone to rethink how they do their business. That is what the management team of Sealed Air Corporation did when it deliberately increased the company's debt burden, using the proceeds to pay a substantial dividend to shareholders. According to economist Karen Wruck, that action, taken when the firm's financial performance was fully satisfactory, forced managers to find ways to improve internal control mechanisms that they almost certainly would not otherwise have considered. 22 Downsizing can serve the same function. So can preemptive abandonment of a technology, a product line, or even a geographical location that has long been part of the organization's identity. Boeing not headquartered in Seattle? Never could happen. Except that it did, and one has to wonder if the decision to move to Chicago was at least partly driven by a hope that the move would jar the organizational balls into the air and allow, if not invite, fresh thinking about how Boeing does its business.
Draconian strategies that make it literally impossible for a system to continue operating in its traditional ways always introduce plenty of turbulence and therefore always offer the opportunity for constructive change. But, as many political and organizational revolutionaries have learned the hard way, such strategies by no means guarantee that the changes that are initiated will turn out to be good for the organization, for its people, for those it serves, or even for the leaders who fomented the revolution. People get hurt in revolutions, even those who lead them, and even when they are successful. 23
...And what it can cost 
We have seen that, in many organizational circumstances, creating the conditions that actively support work teams must be more a revolutionary than an evolutionary undertaking. That is what it eventually turned out to be for Hank, the semiconductor plant production manager discussed in previous chapters. Recall that Hank was remarkably successful in convincing managers much senior to himself to alter compensation, maintenance, and engineering policies or practices so they would better support the work of his production teams. The teams continued to perform well, but eventually their rate of improvement slowed considerably. And Hank still kept them on a relatively short leash, retaining unto himself decision-making authority about those matters he considered most important.
David Abramis and I finished up our research at the plant, which showed that although there was much to admire in what Hank had created, the teams were not really self-managing. 24 And then, taking advantage of the turbulence that accompanied an economic downturn in the semiconductor industry, Hank finally decided to go all the way. The production teams, he declared, would now be called "asset management teams" and they would be given authority to manage all of their resources in pursuing collective objectives.
The transition to asset management teams was difficult, as transitions always are when decision-making authority and accountability for outcomes are altered. No matter how many times it was explained to them in team meetings, some team members seemed unable to understand that they now really were running their own part of the business. Others understood all too well and didn't want any part of it—life was much more comfortable when the buck stopped with Hank rather than with themselves. These responses are not uncommon when people have to come to terms with the fact that they are now the ones who call the shots and who will have to take the heat if things do not go well.
Eventually the changes "took," teams accepted and began to use their new authority, and performance measures for Hank's fab reached new highs. Indeed, his unit was more profitable than any comparable unit not just in the plant but in the entire corporation. Hank began receiving visitors from headquarters, from managers at other high-tech manufacturing firms, and even from academics and journalists who wanted to learn more about what he had accomplished—and how he had pulled it off. By all measures, Hank had a great success on his hands.
Not long thereafter, I received one of my occasional telephone calls from him. "Probably you ought to come out for another visit," he said. "This time to say good-bye. They've decided that some changes need to be made in my area, and the main change is going to be me." It turned out that the human resources department recently had completed its annual employee attitude survey, and the job satisfaction of people in Hank's area had dropped somewhat from its previously high level. That was the reason Hank was given for his termination. In my many years of organizational research I have often seen managers whose units had extraordinarily high employee satisfaction get sacked because their productivity was subpar. This was the first time I had ever heard of someone whose production numbers were off the top of the scale being fired purportedly because of a dip in scores on an attitude survey.
Hank actually was let go because he had gone too far. Drawing both on his intuitive understanding of what it takes to make a great team and on his considerable political skill, he had succeeded in putting in place almost all of the conditions needed to foster work team effectiveness. His work was revolutionary, and it was more than his organization could tolerate. People get hurt in revolutions. Especially those who lead them. Even when they are successful.
· · · ·


Jan 26 The Naked Face

ANNALS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Can you read people's thoughts
just by looking at them?
1.
Some years ago, John Yarbrough was working patrol for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. It was about two in the morning. He and his partner were in the Willowbrook section of South Central Los Angeles, and they pulled over a sports car. "Dark, nighttime, average stop," Yarbrough recalls. "Patrol for me was like going hunting. At that time of night in the area I was working, there was a lot of criminal activity, and hardly anyone had a driver's license. Almost everyone had something intoxicating in the car. We stopped drunk drivers all the time. You're hunting for guns or lots of dope, or suspects wanted for major things. You look at someone and you get an instinctive reaction. And the longer you've been working the stronger that instinctive reaction is."
Yarbrough was driving, and in a two-man patrol car the procedure is for the driver to make the approach and the officer on the passenger side to provide backup. He opened the door and stepped out onto the street, walking toward the vehicle with his weapon drawn. Suddenly, a man jumped out of the passenger side and pointed a gun directly at him. The two of them froze, separated by no more than a few yards. "There was a tree behind him, to his right," Yarbrough recalls. "He was about seventeen. He had the gun in his right hand. He was on the curb side. I was on the other side, facing him. It was just a matter of who was going to shoot first. I remember it clear as day. But for some reason I didn't shoot him." Yarbrough is an ex-marine with close-cropped graying hair and a small mustache, and he speaks in measured tones. "Is he a danger? Sure. He's standing there with a gun, and what person in his right mind does that facing a uniformed armed policeman? If you looked at it logically, I should have shot him. But logic had nothing to do with it. Something just didn't feel right. It was a gut reaction not to shoot-- a hunch that at that exact moment he was not an imminent threat to me." So Yarbrough stopped, and, sure enough, so did the kid. He pointed a gun at an armed policeman on a dark street in South Central L.A., and then backed down.
Yarbrough retired last year from the sheriff's department after almost thirty years, sixteen of which were in homicide. He now lives in western Arizona, in a small, immaculate house overlooking the Colorado River, with pictures of John Wayne, Charles Bronson, Clint Eastwood, and Dale Earnhardt on the wall. He has a policeman's watchfulness: while he listens to you, his eyes alight on your face, and then they follow your hands, if you move them, and the areas to your immediate left and right-- and then back again, in a steady cycle. He grew up in an affluent household in the San Fernando Valley, the son of two doctors, and he is intensely analytical: he is the sort to take a problem and break it down, working it over slowly and patiently in his mind, and the incident in Willowbrook is one of those problems. Policemen shoot people who point guns directly at them at two in the morning. But something he saw held him back, something that ninety-nine people out of a hundred wouldn't have seen.
Many years later, Yarbrough met with a team of psychologists who were conducting training sessions for law enforcement. They sat beside him in a darkened room and showed him a series of videotapes of people who were either lying or telling the truth. He had to say who was doing what. One tape showed people talking about their views on the death penalty and on smoking in public. Another featured a series of nurses who were all talking about a nature film they were supposedly watching, even though some of them were actually watching grisly documentary footage about burn victims and amputees. It may sound as if the tests should have been easy, because we all think we can tell whether someone is lying. But these were not the obvious fibs of a child, or the prevarications of people whose habits and tendencies we know well. These were strangers who were motivated to deceive, and the task of spotting the liars turns out to be fantastically difficult. There is just too much information--words, intonation, gestures, eyes, mouth--and it is impossible to know how the various cues should be weighted, or how to put them all together, and in any case it's all happening so quickly that you can't even follow what you think you ought to follow. The tests have been given to policemen, customs officers, judges, trial lawyers, and psychotherapists, as well as to officers from the F.B.I., the C.I.A., the D.E.A., and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms-- people one would have thought would be good at spotting lies. On average, they score fifty per cent, which is to say that they would have done just as well if they hadn't watched the tapes at all and just guessed. But every now and again-- roughly one time in a thousand--someone scores off the charts. A Texas Ranger named David Maxwell did extremely well, for example, as did an ex-A.T.F. agent named J.J. Newberry, a few therapists, an arbitrator, a vice cop-- and John Yarbrough, which suggests that what happened in Willowbrook may have been more than a fluke or a lucky guess. Something in our faces signals whether we're going to shoot, say, or whether we're lying about the film we just saw. Most of us aren't very good at spotting it. But a handful of people are virtuosos. What do they see that we miss?
2.
All of us, a thousand times a day, read faces. When someone says "I love you," we look into that person's eyes to judge his or her sincerity. When we meet someone new, we often pick up on subtle signals, so that, even though he or she may have talked in a normal and friendly manner, afterward we say, "I don't think he liked me," or "I don't think she's very happy." We easily parse complex distinctions in facial expression. If you saw me grinning, for example, with my eyes twinkling, you'd say I was amused. But that's not the only way we interpret a smile. If you saw me nod and smile exaggeratedly, with the corners of my lips tightened, you would take it that I had been teased and was responding sarcastically. If I made eye contact with someone, gave a small smile and then looked down and averted my gaze, you would think I was flirting. If I followed a remark with an abrupt smile and then nodded, or tilted my head sideways, you might conclude that I had just said something a little harsh, and wanted to take the edge off it. You wouldn't need to hear anything I was saying in order to reach these conclusions. The face is such an extraordinarily efficient instrument of communication that there must be rules that govern the way we interpret facial expressions. But what are those rules? And are they the same for everyone?
In the nineteen-sixties, a young San Francisco psychologist named Paul Ekman began to study facial expression, and he discovered that no one knew the answers to those questions. Ekman went to see Margaret Mead, climbing the stairs to her tower office at the American Museum of Natural History. He had an idea. What if he travelled around the world to find out whether people from different cultures agreed on the meaning of different facial expressions? Mead, he recalls, "looked at me as if I were crazy." Like most social scientists of her day, she believed that expression was culturally determined-- that we simply used our faces according to a set of learned social conventions. Charles Darwin had discussed the face in his later writings; in his 1872 book, "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals," he argued that all mammals show emotion reliably in their faces. But in the nineteen-sixties academic psychologists were more interested in motivation and cognition than in emotion or its expression. Ekman was undaunted; he began travelling to places like Japan, Brazil, and Argentina, carrying photographs of men and women making a variety of distinctive faces. Everywhere he went, people agreed on what those expressions meant. But what if people in the developed world had all picked up the same cultural rules from watching the same movies and television shows? So Ekman set out again, this time making his way through the jungles of Papua New Guinea, to the most remote villages, and he found that the tribesmen there had no problem interpreting the expressions, either. This may not sound like much of a breakthrough. But in the scientific climate of the time it was a revelation. Ekman had established that expressions were the universal products of evolution. There were fundamental lessons to be learned from the face, if you knew where to look.
Paul Ekman is now in his sixties. He is clean-shaven, with closely set eyes and thick, prominent eyebrows, and although he is of medium build, he seems much larger than he is: there is something stubborn and substantial in his demeanor. He grew up in Newark, the son of a pediatrician, and entered the University of Chicago at fifteen. He speaks deliberately: before he laughs, he pauses slightly, as if waiting for permission. He is the sort to make lists, and number his arguments. His academic writing has an orderly logic to it; by the end of an Ekman essay, each stray objection and problem has been gathered up and catalogued. In the mid-sixties, Ekman set up a lab in a ramshackle Victorian house at the University of California at San Francisco, where he holds a professorship. If the face was part of a physiological system, he reasoned, the system could be learned. He set out to teach himself. He treated the face as an adventurer would a foreign land, exploring its every crevice and contour. He assembled a videotape library of people's facial expressions, which soon filled three rooms in his lab, and studied them to the point where he could look at a face and pick up a flicker of emotion that might last no more than a fraction of a second. Ekman created the lying tests. He filmed the nurses talking about the movie they were watching and the movie they weren't watching. Working with Maureen O'Sullivan, a psychologist from the University of San Francisco, and other colleagues, he located people who had a reputation for being uncannily perceptive, and put them to the test, and that's how Yarbrough and the other high-scorers were identified. O'Sullivan and Ekman call this study of gifted face readers the Diogenes Project, after the Greek philosopher of antiquity who used to wander around Athens with a lantern, peering into people's faces as he searched for an honest man. Ekman has taken the most vaporous of sensations-- the hunch you have about someone else-- and sought to give them definition. Most of us don't trust our hunches, because we don't know where they came from. We think they can't be explained. But what if they can?
3.
Paul Ekman got his start in the face-reading business because of a man named Silvan Tomkins, and Silvan Tomkins may have been the best face reader there ever was. Tomkins was from Philadelphia, the son of a dentist from Russia. He was short, and slightly thick around the middle, with a wild mane of white hair and huge black plastic-rimmed glasses. He taught psychology at Princeton and Rutgers, and was the author of "Affect, Imagery, Consciousness," a four-volume work so dense that its readers were evenly divided between those who understood it and thought it was brilliant and those who did not understand it and thought it was brilliant. He was a legendary talker. At the end of a cocktail party, fifteen people would sit, rapt, at Tomkins's feet, and someone would say, "One more question!" and they would all sit there for another hour and a half, as Tomkins held forth on, say, comic books, a television sitcom, the biology of emotion, his problem with Kant, and his enthusiasm for the latest fad diets, all enfolded into one extended riff. During the Depression, in the midst of his doctoral studies at Harvard, he worked as a handicapper for a horse-racing syndicate, and was so successful that he lived lavishly on Manhattan's Upper East Side. At the track, where he sat in the stands for hours, staring at the horses through binoculars, he was known as the Professor. "He had a system for predicting how a horse would do based on what horse was on either side of him, based on their emotional relationship," Ekman said. If a male horse, for instance, had lost to a mare in his first or second year, he would be ruined if he went to the gate with a mare next to him in the lineup. (Or something like that-- no one really knew for certain.) Tomkins felt that emotion was the code to life, and that with enough attention to particulars the code could be cracked. He thought this about the horses, and, more important, he thought this about the human face.
Tomkins, it was said, could walk into a post office, go over to the "Wanted" posters, and, just by looking at mug shots, tell you what crimes the various fugitives had committed. "He would watch the show "To Tell the Truth,' and without fault he could always pick the person who was lying and who his confederates were," his son, Mark, recalls. "He actually wrote the producer at one point to say it was too easy, and the man invited him to come to New York, go backstage, and show his stuff." Virginia Demos, who teaches psychology at Harvard, recalls having long conversations with Tomkins. "We would sit and talk on the phone, and he would turn the sound down as Jesse Jackson was talking to Michael Dukakis, at the Democratic National Convention. And he would read the faces and give his predictions on what would happen. It was profound."
Ekman's most memorable encounter with Tomkins took place in the late sixties. Ekman had just tracked down a hundred thousand feet of film that had been shot by the virologist Carleton Gajdusek in the remote jungles of Papua New Guinea. Some of the footage was of a tribe called the South Fore, who were a peaceful and friendly people. The rest was of the Kukukuku, who were hostile and murderous and who had a homosexual ritual where pre-adolescent boys were required to serve as courtesans for the male elders of the tribe. Ekman was still working on the problem of whether human facial expressions were universal, and the Gajdusek film was invaluable. For six months, Ekman and his collaborator, Wallace Friesen, sorted through the footage. They cut extraneous scenes, focussing just on closeups of the faces of the tribesmen, and when the editing was finished Ekman called in Tomkins.
The two men, protégé and mentor, sat at the back of the room, as faces flickered across the screen. Ekman had told Tomkins nothing about the tribes involved; all identifying context had been edited out. Tomkins looked on intently, peering through his glasses. At the end, he went up to the screen and pointed to the faces of the South Fore. "These are a sweet, gentle people, very indulgent, very peaceful," he said. Then he pointed to the faces of the Kukukuku. "This other group is violent, and there is lots of evidence to suggest homosexuality." Even today, a third of a century later, Ekman cannot get over what Tomkins did. "My God! I vividly remember saying, "Silvan, how on earth are you doing that?' " Ekman recalls. "And he went up to the screen and, while we played the film backward, in slow motion, he pointed out the particular bulges and wrinkles in the face that he was using to make his judgment. That's when I realized, "I've got to unpack the face.' It was a gold mine of information that everyone had ignored. This guy could see it, and if he could see it, maybe everyone else could, too."
Ekman and Friesen decided that they needed to create a taxonomy of facial expressions, so day after day they sat across from each other and began to make every conceivable face they could. Soon, though, they realized that their efforts weren't enough. "I met an anthropologist, Wade Seaford, told him what I was doing, and he said, 'Do you have this movement?'" --and here Ekman contracted what's called the triangularis, which is the muscle that depresses the corners of the lips, forming an arc of distaste-- "and it wasn't in my system, because I had never seen it before. I had built a system not on what the face can do but on what I had seen. I was devastated. So I came back and said, 'I've got to learn the anatomy.' " Friesen and Ekman then combed through medical textbooks that outlined each of the facial muscles, and identified every distinct muscular movement that the face could make. There were forty-three such movements. Ekman and Friesen called them "action units." Then they sat across from each other again, and began manipulating each action unit in turn, first locating the muscle in their mind and then concentrating on isolating it, watching each other closely as they did, checking their movements in a mirror, making notes of how the wrinkle patterns on their faces would change with each muscle movement, and videotaping the movement for their records. On the few occasions when they couldn't make a particular movement, they went next door to the U.C.S.F. anatomy department, where a surgeon they knew would stick them with a needle and electrically stimulate the recalcitrant muscle. "That wasn't pleasant at all," Ekman recalls. When each of those action units had been mastered, Ekman and Friesen began working action units in combination, layering one movement on top of another. The entire process took seven years. "There are three hundred combinations of two muscles," Ekman says. "If you add in a third, you get over four thousand. We took it up to five muscles, which is over ten thousand visible facial configurations." Most of those ten thousand facial expressions don't mean anything, of course. They are the kind of nonsense faces that children make. But, by working through each action-unit combination, Ekman and Friesen identified about three thousand that did seem to mean something, until they had catalogued the essential repertoire of human emotion.
4.
On a recent afternoon, Ekman sat in his office at U.C.S.F., in what is known as the Human Interaction Laboratory, a standard academic's lair of books and files, with photographs of his two heroes, Tomkins and Darwin, on the wall. He leaned forward slightly, placing his hands on his knees, and began running through the action-unit configurations he had learned so long ago. "Everybody can do action unit four," he began. He lowered his brow, using his depressor glabellae, depressor supercilli, and corrugator. "Almost everyone can do A.U. nine." He wrinkled his nose, using his levator labii superioris, alaeque nasi. "Everybody can do five." He contracted his levator palpebrae superioris, raising his upper eyelid.
I was trying to follow along with him, and he looked up at me. "You've got a very good five," he said generously. "The more deeply set your eyes are, the harder it is to see the five. Then there's seven." He squinted. "Twelve." He flashed a smile, activating the zygomatic major. The inner parts of his eyebrows shot up. "That's A.U. ---- distress, anguish." Then he used his frontalis, pars lateralis, to raise the outer half of his eyebrows. "That's A.U. two. It's also very hard, but it's worthless. It's not part of anything except Kabuki theatre. Twenty-three is one of my favorites. It's the narrowing of the red margin of the lips. Very reliable anger sign. It's very hard to do voluntarily." He narrowed his lips. "Moving one ear at a time is still the hardest thing to do. I have to really concentrate. It takes everything I've got." He laughed. "This is something my daughter always wanted me to do for her friends. Here we go." He wiggled his left ear, then his right ear. Ekman does not appear to have a particularly expressive face. He has the demeanor of a psychoanalyst, watchful and impassive, and his ability to transform his face so easily and quickly was astonishing. "There is one I can't do," he went on. "It's A.U. thirty-nine. Fortunately, one of my postdocs can do it. A.U. thirty-eight is dilating the nostrils. Thirty-nine is the opposite. It's the muscle that pulls them down." He shook his head and looked at me again. "Oooh! You've got a fantastic thirty-nine. That's one of the best I've ever seen. It's genetic. There should be other members of your family who have this heretofore unknown talent. You've got it, you've got it." He laughed again. "You're in a position to flash it at people. See, you should try that in a singles bar!"
Ekman then began to layer one action unit on top of another, in order to compose the more complicated facial expressions that we generally recognize as emotions. Happiness, for instance, is essentially A.U. six and twelve-- contracting the muscles that raise the cheek (orbicularis oculi, pars orbitalis) in combination with the zygomatic major, which pulls up the corners of the lips. Fear is A.U. one, two and four, or, more fully, one, two, four, five, and twenty, with or without action units twenty-five, twenty-six, or twenty-seven. That is: the inner brow raiser (frontalis, pars medialis) plus the outer brow raiser (frontalis, pars lateralis) plus the brow-lowering depressor supercilli plus the levator palpebrae superioris (which raises the upper lid), plus the risorius (which stretches the lips), the parting of the lips (depressor labii), and the masseter (which drops the jaw). Disgust? That's mostly A.U. nine, the wrinkling of the nose (levator labii superioris, alaeque nasi), but it can sometimes be ten, and in either case may be combined with A.U. fifteen or sixteen or seventeen.
Ekman and Friesen ultimately assembled all these combinations--and the rules for reading and interpreting them-- into the Facial Action Coding System, or FACS, and wrote them up in a five-hundred-page binder. It is a strangely riveting document, full of details like the possible movements of the lips (elongate, de-elongate, narrow, widen, flatten, protrude, tighten and stretch); the four different changes of the skin between the eyes and the cheeks (bulges, bags, pouches, and lines); or the critical distinctions between infraorbital furrows and the nasolabial furrow. Researchers have employed the system to study everything from schizophrenia to heart disease; it has even been put to use by computer animators at Pixar ("Toy Story"), andat DreamWorks ("Shrek"). FACS takes weeks to master in its entirety, and only five hundred people around the world have been certified to use it in research. But for those who have, the experience of looking at others is forever changed. They learn to read the face the way that people like John Yarbrough did intuitively. Ekman compares it to the way you start to hear a symphony once you've been trained to read music: an experience that used to wash over you becomes particularized and nuanced.
Ekman recalls the first time he saw Bill Clinton, during the 1992 Democratic primaries. "I was watching his facial expressions, and I said to my wife, 'This is Peck's Bad Boy,' " Ekman says. "This is a guy who wants to be caught with his hand in the cookie jar, and have us love him for it anyway. There was this expression that's one of his favorites. It's that hand-in-the-cookie-jar, love-me-Mommy-because-I'm-a-rascal look. It's A.U. twelve, fifteen, seventeen, and twenty-four, with an eye roll." Ekman paused, then reconstructed that particular sequence of expressions on his face. He contracted his zygomatic major, A.U. twelve, in a classic smile, then tugged the corners of his lips down with his triangularis, A.U. fifteen. He flexed the mentalis, A.U. seventeen, which raises the chin, slightly pressed his lips together in A.U. twenty-four, and finally rolled his eyes--and it was as if Slick Willie himself were suddenly in the room. "I knew someone who was on his communications staff. So I contacted him. I said, 'Look, Clinton's got this way of rolling his eyes along with a certain expression, and what it conveys is "I'm a bad boy." I don't think it's a good thing. I could teach him how not to do that in two to three hours.' And he said, 'Well, we can't take the risk that he's known to be seeing an expert on lying.' I think it's a great tragedy, because . . ." Ekman's voice trailed off. It was clear that he rather liked Clinton, and that he wanted Clinton's trademark expression to have been no more than a meaningless facial tic. Ekman shrugged. "Unfortunately, I guess, he needed to get caught--and he got caught."
5.
Early in his career, Paul Ekman filmed forty psychiatric patients, including a woman named Mary, a forty-two-year-old housewife. She had attempted suicide three times, and survived the last attempt--an overdose of pills--only because someone found her in time and rushed her to the hospital. Her children had left home and her husband was inattentive, and she was depressed. When she first went to the hospital, she simply sat and cried, but she seemed to respond well to therapy. After three weeks, she told her doctor that she was feeling much better and wanted a weekend pass to see her family. The doctor agreed, but just before Mary was to leave the hospital she confessed that the real reason she wanted to go on weekend leave was so that she could make another suicide attempt. Several years later, a group of young psychiatrists asked Ekman how they could tell when suicidal patients were lying. He didn't know, but, remembering Mary, he decided to try to find out. If the face really was a reliable guide to emotion, shouldn't he be able to look back on the film and tell that she was lying? Ekman and Friesen began to analyze the film for clues. They played it over and over for dozens of hours, examining in slow motion every gesture and expression. Finally, they saw it. As Mary's doctor asked her about her plans for the future, a look of utter despair flashed across her face so quickly that it was almost imperceptible.
Ekman calls that kind of fleeting look a "microexpression," and one cannot understand why John Yarbrough did what he did on that night in South Central without also understanding the particular role and significance of microexpressions. Many facial expressions can be made voluntarily. If I' m trying to look stern as I give you a tongue-lashing, I'll have no difficulty doing so, and you' ll have no difficulty interpreting my glare. But our faces are also governed by a separate, involuntary system. We know this because stroke victims who suffer damage to what is known as the pyramidal neural system will laugh at a joke, but they cannot smile if you ask them to. At the same time, patients with damage to another part of the brain have the opposite problem. They can smile on demand, but if you tell them a joke they can't laugh. Similarly, few of us can voluntarily do A.U. one, the sadness sign. (A notable exception, Ekman points out, is Woody Allen, who uses his frontalis, pars medialis, to create his trademark look of comic distress.) Yet we raise our inner eyebrows all the time, without thinking, when we are unhappy. Watch a baby just as he or she starts to cry, and you'll often see the frontalis, pars medialis, shoot up, as if it were on a string.
Perhaps the most famous involuntary expression is what Ekman has dubbed the Duchenne smile, in honor of the nineteenth-century French neurologist Guillaume Duchenne, who first attempted to document the workings of the muscles of the face with the camera. If I ask you to smile, you' ll flex your zygomatic major. By contrast, if you smile spontaneously, in the presence of genuine emotion, you' ll not only flex your zygomatic but also tighten the orbicularis oculi, pars orbitalis, which is the muscle that encircles the eye. It is almost impossible to tighten the orbicularis oculi, pars lateralis, on demand, and it is equally difficult to stop it from tightening when we smile at something genuinely pleasurable. This kind of smile "does not obey the will," Duchenne wrote. "Its absence unmasks the false friend." When we experience a basic emotion, a corresponding message is automatically sent to the muscles of the face. That message may linger on the face for just a fraction of a second, or be detectable only if you attached electrical sensors to the face, but It's always there. Silvan Tomkins once began a lecture by bellowing, "The face is like the penis!" and this is what he meant--that the face has, to a large extent, a mind of its own. This doesn't mean we have no control over our faces. We can use our voluntary muscular system to try to suppress those involuntary responses. But, often, some little part of that suppressed emotion--the sense that I' m really unhappy, even though I deny it--leaks out. Our voluntary expressive system is the way we intentionally signal our emotions. But our involuntary expressive system is in many ways even more important: it is the way we have been equipped by evolution to signal our authentic feelings.
"You must have had the experience where somebody comments on your expression and you didn't know you were making it,"Ekman says. "Somebody tells you, "What are you getting upset about?' "Why are you smirking?' You can hear your voice, but you can't see your face. If we knew what was on our face, we would be better at concealing it. But that wouldn't necessarily be a good thing. Imagine if there were a switch that all of us had, to turn off the expressions on our face at will. If babies had that switch, we wouldn't know what they were feeling. They' d be in trouble. You could make an argument, if you wanted to, that the system evolved so that parents would be able to take care of kids. Or imagine if you were married to someone with a switch? It would be impossible. I don't think mating and infatuation and friendships and closeness would occur if our faces didn't work that way."
Ekman slipped a tape taken from the O.J. Simpson trial into the VCR. It was of Kato Kaelin, Simpson's shaggy-haired house guest, being examined by Marcia Clark, one of the prosecutors in the case. Kaelin sits in the witness box, with his trademark vacant look. Clark asks a hostile question. Kaelin leans forward and answers softly. "Did you see that?" Ekman asked me. I saw nothing, just Kato being Kato-- harmless and passive. Ekman stopped the tape, rewound it, and played it back in slow motion. On the screen, Kaelin moved forward to answer the question, and in that fraction of a second his face was utterly transformed. His nose wrinkled, as he flexed his levator labii superioris, alaeque nasi. His teeth were bared, his brows lowered. "It was almost totally A.U. nine," Ekman said. "It's disgust, with anger there as well, and the clue to that is that when your eyebrows go down, typically your eyes are not as open as they are here. The raised upper eyelid is a component of anger, not disgust. It's very quick." Ekman stopped the tape and played it again, peering at the screen. "You know, he looks like a snarling dog."
Ekman said that there was nothing magical about his ability to pick up an emotion that fleeting. It was simply a matter of practice. "I could show you forty examples, and you could pick it up. I have a training tape, and people love it. They start it, and they can't see any of these expressions. Thirty-five minutes later, they can see them all. What that says is that this is an accessible skill."
Ekman showed another clip, this one from a press conference given by Kim Philby in 1955. Philby had not yet been revealed as a Soviet spy, but two of his colleagues, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, had just defected to the Soviet Union. Philby is wearing a dark suit and a white shirt. His hair is straight and parted to the left. His face has the hauteur of privilege.
"Mr. Philby," he is asked. "Mr. Macmillan, the foreign secretary, said there was no evidence that you were the so-called third man who allegedly tipped off Burgess and Maclean. Are you satisfied with that clearance that he gave you?"
Philby answers confidently, in the plummy tones of the English upper class. "Yes, I am."
"Well, if there was a third man, were you in fact the third man?"
"No," Philby says, just as forcefully. "I was not."
Ekman rewound the tape, and replayed it in slow motion. "Look at this," he said, pointing to the screen. "Twice, after being asked serious questions about whether he's committed treason, he's going to smirk. He looks like the cat who ate the canary." The expression was too brief to see normally. But at quarter speed it was painted on his face--the lips pressed together in a look of pure smugness. "He's enjoying himself, isn't he?" Ekman went on. "I call this--duping delight-- the thrill you get from fooling other people." Ekman started the VCR up again. "There's another thing he does." On the screen, Philby was answering another question. "In the second place, the Burgess-Maclean affair has raised issues of great"-- he pauses-- "delicacy." Ekman went back to the pause, and froze the tape. "Here it is,"he said. "A very subtle microexpression of distress or unhappiness. It's only in the eyebrows-- in fact, just in one eyebrow." Sure enough, Philby's right inner eyebrow was raised in an unmistakable A.U. one. "It's very brief," Ekman said. "He's not doing it voluntarily. And it totally contradicts all his confidence and assertiveness. It comes when he's talking about Burgess and Maclean, whom he had tipped off. It's a hot spot that suggests, 'You shouldn't trust what you hear.' "
A decade ago, Ekman joined forces with J. J. Newberry--the ex-A.T.F. agent who is one of the high-scorers in the Diogenes Project-- to put together a program for educating law-enforcement officials around the world in the techniques of interviewing and lie detection. In recent months, they have flown to Washington, D.C., to assist the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. in counter-terrorism training. At the same time, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has asked Ekman and his former student Mark Frank, now at Rutgers, to develop experimental scenarios for studying deception that would be relevant to counter-terrorism. The objective is to teach people to look for discrepancies between what is said and what is signalled--to pick up on the difference between Philby's crisp denials and his fleeting anguish. It's a completely different approach from the shouting cop we see on TV and in the movies, who threatens the suspect and sweeps all of the papers and coffee cups off the battered desk. The Hollywood interrogation is an exercise in intimidation, and its point is to force the suspect to tell you what you need to know. It does not take much to see the limitations of this strategy. It depends for its success on the coöperation of the suspect--when, of course, the suspect's involuntary communication may be just as critical. And it privileges the voice over the face, when the voice and the face are equally significant channels in the same system.
Ekman received his most memorable lesson in this truth when he and Friesen first began working on expressions of anger and distress. "It was weeks before one of us finally admitted feeling terrible after a session where we' d been making one of those faces all day," Friesen says. "Then the other realized that he'd been feeling poorly, too, so we began to keep track." They then went back and began monitoring their body during particular facial movements. "Say you do A.U. one, raising the inner eyebrows, and six, raising the cheeks, and fifteen, the lowering of the corner of the lips," Ekman said, and then did all three. "What we discovered is that that expression alone is sufficient to create marked changes in the autonomic nervous system. When this first occurred, we were stunned. We weren't expecting this at all. And it happened to both of us. We feltterrible . What we were generating was sadness, anguish. And when I lower my brows, which is four, and raise the upper eyelid, which is five, and narrow the eyelids, which is seven, and press the lips together, which is twenty-four, I' m generating anger. My heartbeat will go up ten to twelve beats. My hands will get hot. As I do it, I can't disconnect from the system. It's very unpleasant, very unpleasant."
Ekman, Friesen, and another colleague, Robert Levenson, who teaches at Berkeley, published a study of this effect inScience. They monitored the bodily indices of anger, sadness, and fear--heart rate and body temperature--in two groups. The first group was instructed to remember and relive a particularly stressful experience. The other was told to simply produce a series of facial movements, as instructed by Ekman-- to "assume the position," as they say in acting class. The second group, the people who were pretending, showed the same physiological responses as the first. A few years later, a German team of psychologists published a similar study. They had a group of subjects look at cartoons, either while holding a pen between their lips--an action that made it impossible to contract either of the two major smiling muscles, the risorius and the zygomatic major-- or while holding a pen clenched between their teeth, which had the opposite effect and forced them to smile. The people with the pen between their teeth found the cartoons much funnier. Emotion doesn't just go from the inside out. It goes from the outside in. What's more, neither the subjects "assuming the position" nor the people with pens in their teeth knew they were making expressions of emotion. In the facial-feedback system, an expression you do not even know that you have can create an emotion you did not choose to feel.
It is hard to talk to anyone who knows FACS without this point coming up again and again. Face-reading depends not just on seeing facial expressions but also on taking them seriously. One reason most of us--like the TV cop-- do not closely attend to the face is that we view its evidence as secondary, as an adjunct to what we believe to be realemotion. But there's nothing secondary about the face, and surely this realization is what set John Yarbrough apart on the night that the boy in the sports car came at him with a gun. It's not just that he saw a microexpression that the rest of us would have missed. It's that he took what he saw so seriously that he was able to overcome every self-protective instinct in his body, and hold his fire.
6.
Yarbrough has a friend in the L.A. County Sheriff's Department, Sergeant Bob Harms, who works in narcotics in Palmdale. Harms is a member of the Diogenes Project as well, but the two men come across very differently. Harms is bigger than Yarbrough, taller and broader in the chest, with soft brown eyes and dark, thick hair. Yarbrough is restoring a Corvette and wears Rush Limbaugh ties, and he says that if he hadn't been a cop he would have liked to stay in the Marines. Harms came out of college wanting to be a commercial artist; now he plans to open a bed-and-breakfast in Vermont with his wife when he retires. On the day we met, Harms was wearing a pair of jean shorts and a short-sleeved patterned shirt. His badge was hidden inside his shirt. He takes notes not on a yellow legal pad, which he considers unnecessarily intimidating to witnesses, but on a powder-blue one. "I always get teased because I'm the touchy-feely one," Harms said. "John Yarbrough is very analytical. He thinks before he speaks. There is a lot going on inside his head. He's constantly thinking four or five steps ahead, then formulating whatever his answers are going to be. That's not how I do my interviews. I have a conversation. It's not "Where were you on Friday night?' Because that's the way we normally communicate. I never say, "I'm Sergeant Harms.' I always start by saying, "I'm Bob Harms, and I'm here to talk to you about your case,' and the first thing I do is smile."
The sensation of talking to the two men, however, is surprisingly similar. Normal conversation is like a game of tennis: you talk and I listen, you listen and I talk, and we feel scrutinized by our conversational partner only when the ball is in our court. But Yarbrough and Harms never stop watching, even when they're doing the talking. Yarbrough would comment on my conversational style, noting where I held my hands as I talked, or how long I would wait out a lull in the conversation. At one point, he stood up and soundlessly moved to the door-- which he could have seen only in his peripheral vision--opening it just before a visitor rang the doorbell. Harms gave the impression that he was deeply interested in me. It wasn't empathy. It was a kind of powerful curiosity. "I remember once, when I was in prison custody, I used to shake prisoners' hands," Harms said. "The deputies thought I was crazy. But I wanted to see what happened, because that's what these men are starving for, some dignity and respect."
Some of what sets Yarbrough and Harms and the other face readers apart is no doubt innate. But the fact that people can be taught so easily to recognize microexpressions, and can learn FACS, suggests that we all have at least the potential capacity for this kind of perception. Among those who do very well at face-reading, tellingly, are some aphasics, such as stroke victims who have lost the ability to understand language. Collaborating with Ekman on a paper that was recently published in Nature, the psychologist Nancy Etcoff, of Massachusetts General Hospital, described how a group of aphasics trounced a group of undergraduates at M.I.T. on the nurses tape. Robbed of the power to understand speech, the stroke victims had apparently been forced to become far more sensitive to the information written on people's faces. "They are compensating for the loss in one channel through these other channels," Etcoff says. "We could hypothesize that there is some kind of rewiring in the brain, but I don't think we need that explanation. They simply exercise these skills much more than we do." Ekman has also done work showing that some abused children are particularly good at reading faces as well: like the aphasics in the study, they developed "interpretive strategies"--in their case, so they could predict the behavior of their volatile parents.
What appears to be a kind of magical, effortless intuition about faces, then, may not really be effortless and magical at all. This kind of intuition is a product of desire and effort. Silvan Tomkins took a sabbatical from Princeton when his son Mark was born, and stayed in his house on the Jersey Shore, staring into his son's face, long and hard, picking up the patterns of emotion--the cycles of interest, joy, sadness, and anger--that flash across an infant's face in the first few months of life. He taught himself the logic of the furrows and the wrinkles and the creases, the subtle differences between the pre-smile and the pre-cry face. Later, he put together a library of thousands of photographs of human faces, in every conceivable expression. He developed something called the Picture Arrangement Test, which was his version of the Rorschach blot: a patient would look at a series of pictures and be asked to arrange them in a sequence and then tell a story based on what he saw. The psychologist was supposed to interpret the meaning of the story, but Tomkins would watch a videotape of the patient with the sound off, and by studying the expressions on the patient's face teach himself to predict what the story was. Face-reading, for those who have mastered it, becomes a kind of compulsion; it becomes hard to be satisfied with the level and quality of information that most of us glean from normal social encounters. "Whenever we get together," Harms says of spending time with other face readers, "we debrief each other. We're constantly talking about cases, or some of these videotapes of Ekman's, and we say, "I missed that, did you get that?' Maybe there's an emotion attached there. We're always trying to place things, and replaying interviews in our head."
This is surely why the majority of us don't do well at reading faces: we feel no need to make that extra effort. People fail at the nurses tape, Ekman says, because they end up just listening to the words. That's why, when Tomkins was starting out in his quest to understand the face, he always watched television with the sound turned off. "We are such creatures of language that what we hear takes precedence over what is supposed to be our primary channel of communication, the visual channel," he once said. "Even though the visual channel provides such enormous information, the fact is that the voice preëmpts the individual's attention, so that he cannot really see the face while he listens." We prefer that way of dealing with the world because it does not challenge the ordinary boundaries of human relationships. Ekman, in one of his essays, writes of what he learned from the legendary sociologist Erving Goffman. Goffman said that part of what it means to be civilized is not to "steal" information that is not freely given to us. When someone picks his nose or cleans his ears, out of unthinking habit, we look away. Ekman writes that for Goffman the spoken word is "the acknowledged information, the information for which the person who states it is willing to take responsibility," and he goes on:
When the secretary who is miserable about a fight with her husband the previous night answers, "Just fine," when her boss asks, "How are you this morning?"--that false message may be the one relevant to the boss's interactions with her. It tells him that she is going to do her job. The true message--that she is miserable--he may not care to know about at all as long as she does not intend to let it impair her job performance.
What would the boss gain by reading the subtle and contradictory microexpressions on his secretary's face? It would be an invasion of her privacy and an act of disrespect. More than that, it would entail an obligation. He would be obliged to do something, or say something, or feel something that might otherwise be avoided entirely. To see what is intended to be hidden, or, at least, what is usually missed, opens up a world of uncomfortable possibilities. This is the hard part of being a face reader. People like that have more faith in their hunches than the rest of us do. But faith is not certainty. Sometimes, on a routine traffic stop late at night, you end up finding out that your hunch was right. But at other times you'll never know. And you can't even explain it properly, because what can you say? You did something the rest of us would never have done, based on something the rest of us would never have seen.
"I was working in West Hollywood once, in the nineteen-eighties," Harms said. "I was with a partner, Scott. I was driving. I had just recently come off the prostitution team, and we spotted a man in drag. He was on Sunset, and I didn't recognize him. At that time, Sunset was normally for females. So it was kind of odd. It was a cold night in January. There was an all-night restaurant on Sunset called Ben Franks, so I asked my partner to roll down the window and ask the guy if he was going to Ben Franks-- just to get a reaction. And the guy immediately keys on Scott, and he's got an overcoat on, and he's all bundled up, and he starts walking over to the car. It had been raining so much that the sewers in West Hollywood had backed up, and one of the manhole covers had been cordoned off because it was pumping out water. The guy comes over to the squad car, and he's walking right through that. He's fixated on Scott. So we asked him what he was doing. He says, "I was out for a walk.' And then he says, "I have something to show you.'"
Later, after the incident was over, Harms and his partner learned that the man had been going around Hollywood making serious threats, that he was unstable and had just attempted suicide, that he was in all likelihood about to erupt. A departmental inquiry into the incident would affirm that Harms and his partner had been in danger: the man was armed with a makeshift flamethrower, and what he had in mind, evidently, was to turn the inside of the squad car into an inferno. But at the time all Harms had was a hunch, a sense from the situation and the man's behavior and what he glimpsed inside the man's coat and on the man's face-- something that was the opposite of whatever John Yarbrough saw in the face of the boy in Willowbrook. Harms pulled out his gun and shot the man through the open window. "Scott looked at me and was, like, "What did you do?' because he didn't perceive any danger," Harms said. "But I did."